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1 Introduction
An increase in tertiary educated labor force —skilled workers —is common across coun-
tries. According to the OECD, on average, 20.25% of the population had completed
tertiary education in 1998 and rose to 36.91% in 2017. In the U.S., 19.11% of the pop-
ulation aged 25 and over had completed tertiary education in 1981 while in 2017 this
number increased to 46.36%1. This increase in skilled labor supply has induced a change
in the composition of the labor force in the U.S. In 2000, 31.36% of employees aged 25
and over were high school graduates and 31.11% had a bachelor’s degree or higher, while
in 2017 the proportion of high school graduates dropped to 24.95% and college graduates
increased to 42.26%. Moreover, the wage gap between employees who hold a bachelor’s
degree or higher and high school graduates increased from 41.35% in 1980 to 79.63% in
20172.
Technological change theories such as directed technical change explain this increase
in skill premium. Acemoglu (1998, 2002) argues that when skilled and unskilled workers
are weak substitutes then, if the market size effect dominates the price effect3, technical
change is directed towards the more abundant factor, which increases the productivity
of skilled workers. Profit maximizing firms decide to invest in skill-complementary tech-
nology due to an increase in relative skilled labor supply. Thus, an increase in human
capital induces a skill-biased structural change if there is directed technical change and,
then, structural transformation follows a path in which skilled workers are allocated to
high TFP sectors. Buera et al. (2018) describe skill-biased structural change as the real-
location of sector value added shares towards high-skill intensive industries, causing an
increase in skill premium.
1 Source: OECD.
2 Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
3 The price effect consists of a reduction in relative skilled wage caused directly by this increase in relative skilled
labor supply. The market size effect consists of an increase in relative skilled wage caused by the increase of
relative skilled productivity when profit maximizing firms decide to invest in skill-complementary technology
due to an increase in relative skilled labor supply.
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There is another path for structural transformation. In this path, skilled workers are
likely to end up in low TFP sectors. Baumol (1967) claimed that if the proportion of
output remains between a stagnant sector (with constant labor productivity) and a pro-
gressive sector (with increasing labor productivity), production costs and prices would
tend to rise in the stagnant sector and, therefore, the labor force would move from high
TFP growth to low TFP growth sectors.
These opposite paths —stagnant sector structural change and skill-biased structural
change —suggest that an increase in skilled workers does not determine by itself whether
the economy will achieve high income levels during structural transformation (hereafter,
an economy with high income levels is one that is converging with the U.S.; economies
are considered to have low income levels otherwise). This paper shows that an increase
in human capital has to exist along with directed technical change for an economy to
end up in high income levels. We provide macrodata and microdata evidence that helps
us to ascertain whether an economy has experienced directed technical change during its
structural transformation. The macrodata evidence considers six economic sectors4 and
the existence of directed technical change is identified through an analysis of the relative
TFP of skilled versus unskilled sectors and the relative factors used in the production
process. The increase in relative skilled TFP suggests the existence of directed technical
change because profit maximizing firms develop skill-complementary technologies due to
the increase of skilled labor force, which leads to a rise in relative skilled productivity
increase. The microdata evidence identifies the existence of directed technical change
through the analysis of a GLS estimation of wages as a function of variables, such as
workers’ education level and economic sector. The highest value and significance of the
coefficient of the interaction term between workers’ education level and a high TFP eco-
nomic sector point to the existence of directed technical change.
4 Agriculture, Low-Tech Industry, High-Tech Industry, Unskilled Services, Skilled Market Services, and Skilled
Non-Market Services.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the literature. Section 3 shows
how the existence of directed technical change can be identified through an analysis of
relative skilled TFP. Section 4 presents a GLS panel data estimation for various coun-
tries and identifies the existence of directed technical change when the coefficient of the
interaction term between the level of education and a high TFP economic sector is the
highest and significant. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature
Our paper builds on a rich and diverse literature on structural change, a phenomenon
observed in the process of growth. The literature generally states that less productive
workers are replaced by machines and allocated to other sectors. Thus, less productive
workers are allocated first from agriculture to industry and, then, from industry to ser-
vices. Because of this technological process and reallocation of the labor force, agriculture
and industry tend to be the economy’s most productive sectors and services tend to be
the least productive sector. However, productivity in the services sector varies from one
country to another. In high income countries, such as the U.S., labor productivity in
services is higher than in low income countries. Moreover, low income countries show
low productivity rates not only in the services sector, but in all sectors; see Timmer and
de Vries (2009), Duarte and Restuccia (2010), Garćıa-Santana et al. (2016) and Świȩcki
(2017). From a demand perspective, structural transformation occurs because of changes
in aggregate demand structure. The consumption of goods relative to services differs be-
tween rich and poor households; see Boppart (2014). Most of the literature on structural
transformation uses consumer non-homothetic preferences to explain the shift in con-
sumption from agricultural goods to industrial goods and, successively, to services; see
Comin et al. (2015). In view of the international evidence shown in all these papers, it
seems that structural transformation, by itself, is not a guarantee for a country to achieve
a high income per capita.
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Jorgenson and Timmer (2011), Barany and Siegel (2017) and Cruz (2019) show that
human capital is another important driver of structural transformation. Caselli and Cole-
man (2001) reveal how workers’ skills differ across economic sectors. Skilled labor is
increasing in all sectors across countries, affecting relative prices and investment in phys-
ical capital and making some economic sectors more productive than others. Therefore,
skilled workers might drive structural change to different paths. In particular, there are
two paths of structural transformation in which skilled workers can be placed. The first
determines that the economy moves towards low TFP sectors and, then, skilled workers
might go there. The second path is a skilled-biased structural change.
Beginning with the first path, Baumol (1967) claimed that if the proportion of output
remains between a stagnant sector (with constant labor productivity) and a progressive
sector (with increasing labor productivity), production costs and prices would tend to
rise in the stagnant sector. Therefore, the labor force would move from high TFP growth
to low TFP growth sectors. This has been theoretically explained from the supply side or
the demand side. From the supply side, Ngai and Pissarides (2007) show that structural
change depends on the differences in TFP growth rates across sectors and the elasticity
of substitution between the goods produced in these sectors. In particular, when TFP
growth rates differ among sectors and the elasticity of substitution among the final goods
produced in each sector is lower than one —that is, they are complements—, then la-
bor moves from high TFP growth to low TFP growth sectors. From the demand side,
Kongsamut et al. (2001) propose a general balanced growth model that is consistent with
the Kaldor facts and the massive reallocation of labor from one sector to the others. They
use Stone-Geary preferences5 to explain that when the income of households increases,
the proportion of income spent on agricultural goods drops and the proportion spent on
the other goods increases —that is, the Engel’s Law—. Under a knife-edge condition, the
5 Stone-Geary preferences are often used to model problems involving subsistence levels of consumption. That
is, a certain minimal level of some good has to be consumed regardless of its price and the consumer income
before the individual decides to spend a positive amount on other goods.
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economy grows at a constant rate while there is this shift towards the services sector.
The second path is a skill-biased structural change. This has been theoretically ex-
plained from a supply side or a demand side. From the demand side, Buera and Kaboski
(2009, 2012) and Buera et al. (2018) describe the skill-biased structural change experi-
enced in advanced economies6 through a two-sector model —a high skilled labor sector
(services) and a low skilled labor sector (goods)—that explains the rise of the skill pre-
mium caused by technical change. They assume non-homothetic preferences such that
the expenditure share of services increases in income. They show that differences in rel-
ative wages are given by changes in the relative supply of high skilled labor, skill-biased
technological change and other technological changes. They also suggest that industries
could be organized by skill intensity. From the supply side, Rogerson (2008) finds that
relative increases in taxes and technological catch-up can account for most of the differ-
ences between the European and American time allocations. In the services sector, he
considers two types of production: home production —non-taxed substitutive services for
those produced in the market—and taxed market production. Since skilled workers are
mostly in market services and their productivity is higher than that of unskilled work-
ers, market services productivity grows faster than home productivity. Therefore, with
an increase in skilled labor, these workers are reallocated into the market services sector
and home production falls. He finds that hours worked in Europe decline by almost 45%
compared to the U.S. over the analyzed period (1956-2003), which was almost entirely
accounted for by the fact that Europe develops a much smaller market services sector
than the U.S. Moreover, the U.S. has experienced a shift from home to market produc-
tion. In addition, Timmer and de Vries (2009) find that productivity improvement in
market services is greater than productivity growth in manufacturing. Herrendorf et al.
(2014) show that sectoral productivity growth differences are the main factor behind
structural transformation among broad sectors in the U.S. In a multi-sector model in
6 Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, United King-
dom, and the United States.
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which sector differences depend on human capital intensity, Herrendorf and Schoellman
(2018) show that average wages in agriculture are lower than those in the other sectors
and, at the same time, this sector has less educated workers. Thus, skilled workers end
up in high TFP sectors. According to the skill-biased structural change, it seems that if
a country increases its human capital, then it will reach this skill-biased structural change.
Acemoglu (1998, 2002) argues that there has been a directed technical change, at
least for the U.S. He shows that the increase in relative skilled labor supply has two
effects: a price effect and a market size effect. The elasticity of substitution between fac-
tors determines which of these two effects dominates. In particular, when both factors
are complements, the price effect dominates and when both factors are weak substitutes7,
the market size effect dominates and, then, the relative skilled wage increases at the same
time that there is a skill-biased technical change. Then, according to Acemoglu (1998,
2002), an increase in relative skilled workers will induce a skill-biased structural change
in the presence of directed technical change.
The aforementioned literature does not address questions related to the final stage
of structural transformation across high and low income countries. It suggests that all
economies might follow the same path. This paper highlights the importance of directed
technical change in the final stage that an economy can reach during structural trans-
formation when there is an increasing skilled labor supply. The rise of skilled workers
might induce directed technical change or not. If these two phenomena do co-exist during
structural change, an economy will end up in high TFP sectors. Similar to Kuralbayeva
and Stefanski (2013), we develop macrodata and microdata approaches to identify the
existence of directed technical change. However, we consider more than just the tradi-
tional sectors—agriculture, industry and services—. Buera et al. (2018) and Duernecker
et al. (2017) also suggest a wider division of sectors. We find that the existence of di-
7 In particular, the elasticity of substitution has to be higher than 1 and lower than 2. There is general consensus
that this is the case between skilled and unskilled workers.
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rected technical change during structural transformation is needed for skilled workers to
end up in high TFP sectors. Thus, not all the economies will necessarily follow the same
pattern of structural change: some will end up in low TFP sectors —Low-Tech Industry
and Unskilled Services—and some in high TFP sectors —High-Tech Industry and Skilled
Market Services—. We show that directed technical change has occurred in high income
countries such as the U.S., South Korea and France since the relative TFP of skilled
sectors compared to unskilled ones has increased over time and relative wages are higher
for tertiary educated workers who work in high TFP sectors. This finding can help us
to understand why the gap in GDP per capita between South Korea and the U.S. is
shrinking over time. Canada has not experienced a directed technical change and, then,
its skilled workers have ended up in low TFP sectors during structural change. There is
a lack of clear evidence of directed technical change for Italy and Spain.
3 Macrodata Evidence
It is important to analyze how structural transformation has taken place in several
economies. The usual structural transformation has been characterized by shifting the
value added (and the labor force) out of the agriculture sector and allocating it first to
the industry sector and, after, to the services sector. We analyze this structural transfor-
mation by dividing the economy into six sectors: Agriculture, Low-Tech Industry, High-
Tech Industry, Unskilled Services, Skilled Market Services, and Skilled Non-Market Ser-
vices. We follow Herrendorf and Schoellman (2018), who consider that skilled services
are those that employ workers with at least thirteen years of education on average, and
Dix-Carneiro (2014), who uses the OECD criterion that classifies industries according to
their technology intensity in the report “Towards a Knowledge Based Economy”8. We
8 In addition to Herrendorf and Schoellman (2018), we classify the skilled services sector into Skilled Market
Services (finance and insurance activities, real state activities, professional, scientific, technical, administrative
and support service activities, and utilities) and Skilled Non-Market Services (education, health and public
administration, and defense). The Skilled Market Services sector is defined as the sector that uses high skilled
labor at the same time that prices and wages are determined by the market. This latter assumption is impor-
tant given that the income determined by these prices is expected to be higher than in other market sectors.
We make the distinction between Market and Non-Market Skilled Services because it is the government that
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use EU KLEMS and WORLD KLEMS databases, which have sector information about
value added, labor and capital for some countries. Figure 1 shows the share of value
added of our six sectors for Canada, France, Italy, South Korea, Spain, and the U.S.9.
We can see that the share of the value added of the Agriculture sector has decreased in
all countries over time, as structural change theories predict. The Skilled Market Services
sector, a high TFP sector, also shows an increasing behavior in all these countries. In the
U.S., this sector produced 20.36% of the total value added in 1970 and rose to 31.69% in
2015. The Unskilled Services sector rose considerably in Spain only; it produced 21.64%
of the total value added in 1970 and 31.43% in 2017. Spain is the only country where
this sector has the highest level of value added. South Korea is the only country that ex-
hibits an increasing tendency in the High-Tech Industry sector (in addition to the Skilled
Market Services sector, the other high TFP sector). This sector produced 5.71% of the
total value added in 1970, which rose to 21.76% in 2012. France, Italy and the U.S. show
similar patterns in production but have shifted from Unskilled Services to Skilled Market
Services in different periods of time. Canada shows relatively constant behavior of its sec-
tors over time. Figure 2 compares the shares of the value added produced by high TFP
sectors relative to the U.S. The share of value added of the High-Tech Industry sector in
South Korea is much higher than in the U.S. over time and shows a constant increase.
The other analyzed countries show declining and lower shares of the value added of this
sector compared to the U.S. Regarding the Skilled Market Services, South Korea shows
a constant increase in the share of value added of this sector, but it is still lower than
decides the wages and, therefore, the value added in the Skilled Non-Market Services. In fact, and in general,
these wages are the same for the same job in the geographical area they are provided. These skilled services
have a greater resemblance to market services when they are provided at regional or municipal level. Then,
wages do not necessarily capture the differences in productivity between skilled and unskilled workers. Fur-
thermore, we also divide the industry sector into High-Tech and Low-Tech Industry, as in Dix-Carneiro (2014),
classifying according to the technology intensity. High-Tech Industry includes alcohol production, nuclear fuels,
oil refining, coke, chemical products, machinery and equipment, office, accounting and computing machinery,
electrical machinery and apparatus, radio, television and communications equipment, medical, precision and
optical instruments, motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, and other transportation equipment. Low-Tech
Industry includes food and beverage, tobacco products, textiles, apparel, leather products and footwear, wood
products, paper, cellulose, paper products, editing and printing, rubber and plastic products, non-metallic
mineral products, basic metals, fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment), furniture, and
recycling.
9 Given that in Section 4 we make a complementary analysis with microdata information, we will refer only to
those countries for which we have available data at both levels —micro and macro—.
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the U.S. The evolution of this sector in France is similar to the U.S. The other European
countries —Spain and Italy—also show increasing shares of the value added of this sector
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Fig. 1. Share of Value Added
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Fig. 2. Share of Value Added Compared to the U.S.
Source: EU KLEMS and WORLD KLEMS Databases.
Having described the value added evolution, we now look at the reallocation of the
labor force. Figure 3 shows that the labor force has been allocated as structural change
theories suggest —from agriculture to industry and, then, from industry to services—. In
Italy, South Korea and Spain the labor force has been allocated mostly in the Unskilled
Services sector over time. Canada and France have allocated the labor force into the
Unskilled Services and the Skilled Non-Market Services sectors. In the U.S., the labor
force in the Skilled Market Services sector has increased over time and has extended to
nearly the same level of labor force in the Unskilled Services and the Skilled Non-Market
Services sectors. Figure 4 shows that the share of labor allocated into the High-Tech
Industry in South Korea and Italy is higher than in the U.S. while the share of labor
allocated into the Skilled Market Services sector in all of the analyzed countries is low
11
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Fig. 3. Share of Labor
Source: EU KLEMS and WORLD KLEMS Databases.
10 The shares of value added and labor compared to the U.S. for the other sectors are illustrated in the Appendix,








1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Canada France Italy







1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Canada France Italy
South Korea Spain United States
Fig. 4. Share of Labor of Compared to the U.S.
Source: EU KLEMS and WORLD KLEMS Databases.
Our objective is to determine whether an increase of skilled labor supply11 leads an
economy towards high income levels. It is expected that if the increasing skilled labor
supply is allocated in high TFP sectors, then the economy would end up in high income
levels, since the value added produced by these sectors is always higher. Figure 5 shows
that the value added of high TFP sectors indeed depends positively on the increase in
the skilled labor force in the U.S., France, South Korea, Italy and Spain whereas it de-
pends negatively on this increase in Canada12. This evidence shows that the increase of
the skilled labor supply alone does not determine whether the economy will end up in
high income levels. We argue that an economy ends up in high income levels if directed
technical change exists at the same time that there is an increase in the skilled labor
11 Figure 11 in the Appendix shows the increase in skilled labor supply across countries over time.
12 The results of the linear fit are given in Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix.
13
supply. As a result, if these two phenomena coexist, the gap in GDP per capita relative
to the U.S. would shrink over time, as in South Korea13 (South Korean GDP per capita
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Fig. 5. Share of Value Added of the Skilled and Unskilled Sectors vs Completed Tertiary Educated Population.
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Source: World Economic Outlook.
13 For France, Spain and Italy, the gap in GDP per capita relative to the U.S. might not shrink for reasons other
than the non-existence of directed technical change: a decline of the hours worked compared to the U.S., the
high level of unemployment and the relatively small number of skilled workers; see Rogerson (2008).
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In light of this evidence, it seems that the two patterns of structural change discussed
in Section 2 can emerge when different countries are analyzed. Some countries may allo-
cate their skilled workers in high TFP sectors in the process of structural transformation
and others may not. What is important to assess is whether the increase in skilled workers
occurred with a directed technical change. If this is the case, an economy would end up
at high income levels after structural transformation since skilled workers would be allo-
cated to high TFP sectors. To identify whether directed technical change exists during
the structural transformation, we first make a Solow residual decomposition for skilled
sectors relative to unskilled ones. Through the analysis of relative TFP, we can determine
whether directed technical change has existed at the same time as the increase in skilled
labor supply. In Section 4, to corroborate the results of the Solow residual decomposition,
we make a GLS estimation of wages as a function of usual variables such as the level of
education and the economic sector.
3.1 Solow Residual Decomposition
Acemoglu (1998) considers a unique final good that is produced from two inputs: one us-
ing skilled labor and the other using unskilled labor. To have directed technical change,
the elasticity of substitution between both inputs has to be between 1 and 2. Instead we
consider two different final goods in each sector: one produced using skilled labor and
the other using unskilled labor, with elasticity of substitution between them in the util-
ity function between 1 and 2. Thus, since the model is isomorphic to that of Acemoglu
(1998), we would obtain the same conclusions. But now, we can do a Solow residual
decomposition for each sector. This decomposition can be used to identify the relative
supply of factors and, more importantly, the relative TFP. It is this relative TFP that
will inform us whether directed technical change has existed.







where Yi is the production of sector i, Ki is the amount of capital used in sector i, Li is
the labor force allocated to sector i, and Ai is the corresponding TFP for sector i. Taking
logarithms on both sides of the equation and isolating the TFP term leads to
ln(Ai) = ln(Yi)− αln(Ki)− (1− α)ln(Li). (2)
Thus, the TFP for each sector can be identified. We assume the conventional value of
α = 1/3 for the share of capital in income. Once the sector specific TFP has been found,
we can compute the relative share of TFP between sector i and j as
ln (Ai/Aj) = ln (Yi/Yj)− αln (Ki/Kj)− (1− α)ln (Li/Lj) , i 6= j. (3)
Given this equation, we can identify whether an increase in the relative skilled labor
supply has indeed implied a directed technical change.
We calculate logarithms of the relative value added of the skilled sectors relative to
the unskilled ones, the relative supply of labor, the relative accumulation of capital and
the relative TFP. By analyzing the relative TFP we can conclude whether directed tech-
nical change has existed in the process of structural transformation and, then, whether
the economy will end up in high income levels. If the relative TFP between skilled and
unskilled sectors increases over time while there is also an increase in relative skilled la-
bor, directed technical change has existed during structural transformation.
We use information provided in EU KLEMS and WORLD KLEMS databases. Basic
and Capital Input Files are used to compute the shares of production —value added14
—, labor and capital for the six sectors in the U.S., South Korea, Spain, Italy, France,
and Canada. We use all the available information for each country15. We also use OECD
14 See Buera et al. (2018).
15 U.S. and Spain: from 1970 to 2015. South Korea: from 1970 to 2012. Italy: from 1970 to 2015 for the value
added and the share of labor and from 1995 to 2014 for the share of capital. France: from 1975 to 2015 for
16
information about the tertiary educated population aged 25 and over.
Given that structural transformation moves towards the services sector, we first ana-
lyze the relative TFP of this sector. Figure 7 shows that in general the relative TFP of
the Skilled (Skilled Market and Skilled Non-Market; solid line) and the Skilled Market
(dashed line) Services relative to the Unskilled Services seems to increase over time for
the analyzed countries (left axis) at the same time that the number of tertiary educated
workers increased (right axis). Relative accumulation of capital has diminished and rel-
ative TFP has increased while the skilled labor supply has also increased for countries
such as South Korea, France and the U.S. Spain’s relative TFP seems to have increased
only in the last five years and, therefore, the increase in relative value added might be
explained only by the increase in the relative share of labor and not by the increase in
relative TFP. Because of the few observations available for Italy and the behavior of the
relative accumulation of capital for Canada that seems to be flat, we could have an am-
biguous interpretation of the evolution of relative TFP for these countries16.
the value added and the share of labor and from 1978 to 2015 for the share of capital. Canada: from 1961 to
2010 for the shares of labor and capital and from 1961 to 2008 for the value added.
16 If we analyze only the Skilled Market Services sector—dashed lines—we see that its relative TFP is above the
relative TFP of the Skilled Services sector in all the countries. This fact indicates that the relative productivity
of the Skilled Non-Market Services sector is lower than that of the Skilled Market Services sector. This means


























































































































































































































































































1960 1980 2000 20201960 1980 2000 2020
South Korea United States
Capital (Skilled/Unskilled) Capital (Skilled Market/Unskilled)
Labor (Skilled/Unskilled) Labor (Skilled Market/Unskilled)
TFP (Skilled/Unskilled) TFP (Skilled Market/Unskilled)
Value Added (Skilled/Unskilled) Value Added (Skilled Market/Unskilled)
Completed Tertiay Education
year
Fig. 7. Relative Value Added, Relative Supply of Labor, Relative Accumulation of Capital, Relative TFP of the
Skilled (and Skilled Market) Services Sector vs the Unskilled Services Sector - Completed Tertiary Education.
Source: EU KLEMS and WORLD KLEMS Databases.
Figure 8 shows the linear regression of the log of the relative TFP of the Skilled Ser-
vices vs the Unskilled Services and the log of the share of completed tertiary educated
population. The share of completed tertiary educated population has a positive impact
18
on the relative TFP of the Skilled Services vs the Unskilled Services in France and the
U.S. However, it shows a negative impact in South Korea. We believe that this unex-
pected finding for South Korea is due to the few observations we have on the share of
completed tertiary educated population. For this variable we only have 17 out of the 43
observations that determine the evolution of relative TFP in South Korea. The share of
completed tertiary educated population also has a negative impact on relative TFP in
Canada, which suggests that directed technical change has not occurred. The share of
completed tertiary educated population has a positive impact on relative TFP in Italy
and Spain as well. However, previous findings in the behavior of the relative TFP prevent
us from drawing relevant conclusions for these countries. Given the insights of Figures
7 and 8, we might conclude that a directed technical change has occurred in the Skilled
Services and in the Skilled Market Services sectors for South Korea, France and the U.S.
It seems that directed technical change in these sectors has not yet taken place in Canada,


























2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8
Log of Completed Tertiary Education
n = 18    RMSE =  .0161432




























Log of Completed Tertiary Education
n = 25    RMSE =  .0301436






























1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Log of Completed Tertiary Education
n = 25    RMSE =  .0749466






















3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4
Log of Completed Tertiary Education
n = 20    RMSE =  .0798574



























2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8
Log of Completed Tertiary Education
n = 17    RMSE =  .0528675

































3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8
Log of Completed Tertiary Education
n = 35    RMSE =  .0321462




Fig. 8. Regression of the Log of the Relative TFP —Skilled Services vs Unskilled Services —and the Log of
Completed Tertiary Education.
Source: EU KLEMS and WORLD KLEMS Databases.
We now group all the high TFP sectors (Skilled Services and High-Tech Industry)
and repeat the same analysis. We see in Figure 9 that the relative TFP shows almost the
same behavior as before for almost all the economies. Spain’s relative TFP has a higher
slope than before, which indicates that there may have been a directed technical change
in the High-Tech Industry. In addition, the relative TFP of Canada shows a flatter path,
which suggests that at least for Canada, a directed technical change in high TFP sectors
has not yet occurred. For Italy, we cannot draw relevant conclusions due to the short
























































































































































































































































































1960 1980 2000 20201960 1980 2000 2020
South Korea United States
Capital (Skilled/Unskilled) Capital (Skilled Market/Unskilled)
Labor (Skilled/Unskilled) Labor (Skilled Market/Unskilled)
TFP (Skilled/Unskilled) TFP (Skilled Market/Unskilled)
Value Added (Skilled/Unskilled) Value Added (Skilled Market/Unskilled)
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Fig. 9. Relative Value Added, Relative Supply of Labor, Relative Accumulation of Capital, Relative TFP of the
Skilled (and Skilled Market) Sectors vs the Unskilled Sectors - Completed Tertiary Education.
Source: EU KLEMS and WORLD KLEMS Databases.
Figure 10 supports the insights from Figure 9. The share of completed tertiary edu-
cated population has a positive effect on the relative TFP of the Skilled Sectors vs the
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Unskilled Sectors in France and the U.S. South Korea again shows a negative slope. How-
ever, it is now flatter than that of Figure 8. As previously stated, we consider that this
unexpected finding for South Korea is due to the few observations we have for the share of
completed tertiary educated population. Furthermore, we see a more negative impact of
the share of completed tertiary educated population on the relative TFP of these sectors
in Canada, which is consistent with the insights described in previous paragraphs. Lastly,
the share of completed tertiary educated population has a positive impact on the relative
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Fig. 10. Regression of the Log of the Relative TFP —Skilled Sectors vs Unskilled Sectors—and the Log of
Completed Tertiary Education.
Source: EU KLEMS and WORLD KLEMS Databases.
From the analysis in this section, we conclude first that it is key to consider more
economic subsectors than the usual three sectors, to gain a deeper understanding of how
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structural change has evolved across countries. Second, an increasingly skilled labor sup-
ply is only a necessary condition to shift structural transformation towards high income
sectors, but directed technical change is also required as it leads to skilled workers ending
up in high TFP sectors. Moreover, an economy will follow one of the two possible paths
of structural transformation depending on the existence of directed technical change. If
an economy experiences directed technical change during structural transformation, we
would see that the relative TFP of the skilled sectors versus the unskilled sectors rises. We
would also see a positive impact of the share of completed tertiary educated population
on the relative TFP of sectors. This is the case of France, South Korea and the U.S. As
Canada shows a flat relative TFP, and a negative impact of the share of completed ter-
tiary educated population on the relative TFP of sectors, we argue that directed technical
change has not yet occurred in this economy. In Spain, we argue that directed technical
change might have existed in the High-Tech Industry as the relative TFP increases when
we consider not only the services sector but the industry sector. We do not draw any cer-
tain conclusions about Italy since we have few observations on capital accumulation and,
then, on the relative TFP. Finally, we argue that the existence of directed technical change
might drive a reduction in the GDP per capita gap relative to the U.S., as in South Korea.
To confirm our findings in this section, we perform a GLS panel data estimation of
wages as a function of education level and economic sectors. The results (in particular,
the positive value and the significance of the coefficient of the interaction term between
these variables) will inform us whether the increase in skilled labor supply has caused
innovation by profit maximizing firms in the skilled sectors making the skill premium
increase. This would lead to skilled workers ending up in high TFP sectors.
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4 Microdata Evidence
The existence of directed technical change implies that an increase in the supply of skilled
labor relative to unskilled labor makes the profits of innovating skill-complementary tech-
nologies increase, which triggers an increase in skilled workers’ wages. If we assume that
labor supply is inelastic at a given period of time, each worker will choose the sector that
provides the highest wage, since utility is increasing in the wage. Consequently, given
that the production of each sector is an indirect function of wage, we make a panel data
estimation17 where the wage is the endogenous variable and specific characteristics of
workers are used as exogenous variables. The model specification is
ln(wij) = βjsj + βxXij + βEEij + βI(sjEij) + βtt+ εij, (4)
where wij is the wage of worker i in a company of sector j, sj is a sector dummy, Xij
are controls for characteristics of the worker —age, age square, gender, and geographic
area—, Eij is a dummy of the level of education of worker i in sector j, sjEij is the
interaction term between the level of education of worker i and the economic sector j of
her company, βt is the time fixed effect, and εij is an i.i.d. error with zero mean.
We expect that the Mincer returns for skilled workers —those with completed tertiary
education —will be higher than those for unskilled workers—those with non-completed
tertiary education—. However, our emphasis is on the Mincer returns for skilled workers
in high TFP sectors18. Therefore, we include the interaction term sjEij. We expect the
highest value and significance of the coefficient of the interaction term between skilled
workers and high TFP sectors if directed technical change exists. Table 9 describes the
sources used for our microdata analysis. As mentioned earlier, we only present results for
countries that have information available at micro and macro levels and, then, compar-
17 In the data sets used, we can identify an individual—or a household—in different periods of time. However,
these data sets are unbalanced.
18 We make the same classification for sectors as in Section 3; i.e., we create a variable with the classification of
the main economic activity of the company into Agriculture, Low-Tech Industry, High-Tech Industry, Unskilled
Services, Skilled Market Services, and Skilled Non-Market Services.
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isons can be done19.
Table 1. Sources of Information for the Panel Data Estimation.
Country Source
U.S. IPUMS International: U.S. Labor Survey.
Yearly available data: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005, 2010.
South Korea Korea Labor Institute: Korean Labor & Income Panel Study.
Yearly available data: from 1998 to 2016.
Canada Statistics Canada: Labor Force Survey.
Monthly available data: from 1997 to 2015.
France National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies:
Labor Force Survey.
Quarterly available data: from 2003 to 2012.
Italy National Institute of Statistics: Labor Force Survey.
Quarterly available data: from 2009 to 2018.
Spain National Institute of Statistics: Wage Structure Survey.
Yearly available data: 2010, 2014.
In each data set, we drop those observations that did not have the required informa-
tion to run the regression20. The main variables for the estimation such as wages, level
of education and economic activity usually have some missing or unknown observations,
so we drop these observations and perform the analysis with the remaining data set. We
also use the CPI index (yearly, monthly or quarterly, depending on the frequency of the
database) published by the OECD to calculate real wages and avoid ambiguous interpre-
tations of salary increases owing to inflation. We use the Unskilled Services sector as the
category of reference21. Given that there are a varying number of geographic areas across
countries, we group them into four groups based on the last available GDP for each area,
since we believe that firms in major cities are more likely to pay higher salaries and, then,
we must control for that. We use the 25%, 50%, and 75% percentile of the GDP to create
19 IPUMS International has a wide data set at micro level for countries such as India, Indonesia, South Africa,
Brazil, and others, which would have helped us to make a wider analysis. But the required information at
macro level is not available for the value added, labor and accumulation of capital across sectors for these
countries. Additionally, microdata information was requested for other countries for which we have information
at macro level but, unfortunately, we could not access it.
20 We do not use imputation techniques for individuals with missing or unknowns since these missing or unknowns
are not only in the numerical variables but in the categorical variables. Moreover, the dropped observations
had similar characteristics to observations that were kept for the estimation.
21 We also use the Agriculture sector as the category of reference and we obtain the same conclusions for the
existence of directed technical change; see Tables 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in the Appendix.
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these groups. The geographical areas included in the 25% percentile will be the reference
category in our estimations. Tables 2 to 7 show the results of GLS panel data estimations
for the six countries mentioned before. Model (1) does not include geographic controls
nor time fixed effects. Model (2) includes geographic controls but no time fixed effects.
Model (3) includes both. As this latter model gives the best estimates among the three
models, we describe only its results below22.
Table 2 shows the results of the GLS estimation for the U.S. As expected, the coef-
ficients of the interaction term between the level of education and the high TFP sectors
(High-Tech Industry and Skilled Market Services) are the highest and significant. Wages
increase more if a worker has tertiary education and works in the High-Tech Industry
(12.7% more) or in the Skilled Market Services (12.8% more) rather than in the Unskilled
Services. This means that a skilled worker employed at a company in one of these sectors
has the highest wage and does not have any incentive to move towards another sector.
Therefore, we can conclude that the increase in skilled labor supply has made profit max-
imizing firms invest in innovation in these high TFP sectors making productivity (and
then wages) increase, implying at the same time an increase in the incentives for skilled
workers to work in these sectors. As a result, we can confirm that a directed technical
change has occurred in the U.S. in high TFP sectors. Thus, skilled workers have been
allocated to these sectors during the structural transformation leading the economy to-
wards high income levels.
In broader results, we see that Mincer returns for tertiary education are positively
high. The wages of workers who have completed tertiary education are 54.2% on average
higher than those of workers who have non-completed tertiary education. Wages in the
High (and Low)-Tech Industry and the Skilled Market Services are higher than in the
22 The Wage Structure Survey of Spain does not include any geographic area information. Therefore, Table 7 only
shows model (1) —with no geographic controls and no time fixed effects—and model (2) —with no geographic
controls but with time fixed effects—. The results of model (2) are described below.
26
Unskilled Services: the High-Tech Industry pays wages that are 34.9% higher than the
Unskilled Services, the Skilled Market Services 22.6%, the Low-Tech Industry 18.1%, and
the Skilled Non-Market Services 14.0%. Finally, firms in Regions 1 and 3 pay more than
those in Region 4 23.
Table 3 shows the results of the GLS estimation for South Korea. As expected, the co-
efficients of the interaction term between the level of education and the high TFP sectors
are the highest and significant: the wage of a worker with tertiary education working in
the High-Tech Industry is 53.7% higher than in the Unskilled Services, and 27.5% higher
in the Skilled Market Services. This means that a skilled worker employed at a company
in one of these sectors has the highest wage and does not have any incentive to move
towards another sector. Similar to the U.S., we can say that the increase in skilled labor
supply has made profit maximizing firms invest in innovation in these high TFP sectors,
which makes productivity (and then wages) increase. At the same time, this implies an
increase in incentives for skilled workers to move towards these sectors. Then, we can con-
firm that a directed technical change has occurred in South Korea as well. Thus, skilled
workers have been allocated to high TFP sectors during structural transformation, which
leads the economy towards high income levels and reduces the GDP per capita gap with
the U.S.
More general results indicate that Mincer returns for tertiary education are positive.
The wages of workers who have completed tertiary education are 12.9% on average higher
than those of workers who have non-completed tertiary education. Wages are higher in
the Skilled Non-Market Services, the Skilled Market Services, and the Low-Tech Indus-
try relative to the Unskilled Services: the Skilled Non-Market Services pays wages 25.7%
higher than the Unskilled Services, the Skilled Market Services 23.4%, and the Low-Tech
Industry 3.7%, whereas the coefficient of the High-Tech Industry is not significant. Fi-
23 Examples are: New York for Region 1, Texas for Region 2, California for Region 3, and Ohio for Region 4.
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nally, firms located in areas producing more than 25% of total GDP pay more but their
coefficients are not significant24.
Table 4 shows the results of the GLS estimation for France. As expected, the coeffi-
cients of the interaction term between the level of education and high TFP sectors are
the highest and significant: the wage of a worker with tertiary education working in the
High-Tech Industry is 16.2% higher than in the Unskilled Services and 8.3% higher if she
works in the Skilled Market Services. This means that a skilled worker employed at a
company in one of these sectors has the highest wage and does not have any incentive
to move towards another sector. Similar to South Korea and the U.S., we can confirm
that a directed technical change has existed for France in high TFP sectors. Thus, skilled
workers have been allocated to these sectors during the structural transformation leading
the economy towards high income levels.
In broader results, we see that Mincer returns are positive for tertiary educated work-
ers. The wages of workers with tertiary education are 37.2% on average higher than those
of workers who have non-completed tertiary education. As expected, wages are higher
in all the sectors relative to the Unskilled Services: the Skilled Market Services and the
Low-Tech Industry pay wages 7.2% higher than the Unskilled Services, the Skilled Non-
Market Services 1.5%, and the High-Tech Industry 0.3%. Lastly, firms located in regions
that produce more than 25% of the total GDP pay more25.
Table 5 shows the results of the GLS estimation for Canada. The information on age in
this Labor Force Survey is a categorical variable and we group the data according to the
OECD classification26. Mincer returns for tertiary education are positive. The wages of
workers who have tertiary education are 27.1% on average higher than those workers who
24 Examples are: Seoul for Region 1, Incheon for Region 2, Daegu for Region 3, and Gwangju for Region 4.
25 Examples are: Paris for Region 1, Haute-Savoie for Region 2, Yvelines for Region 3, and Doubs for Region 4.
26 See https://data.oecd.org/emp/employment-rate-by-age-group.htm.
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have non-completed tertiary education. The High-Tech Industry pays wages 46.4% higher
than the Unskilled Services, the Low-Tech Industry 39.4%, the Skilled Market Services
26.3%, and the Skilled Non-Market Services 21.6%. Workers with tertiary education earn
10.9% more if they work in the Skilled Non-Market Services rather than in the Unskilled
Services and 3.7% higher if they work in the Skilled Market Services. Therefore, workers
have higher incentives to move towards the Skilled Non-Market Services. Firms located
in regions that produce over 25% of total GDP pay more27. Considering these results and
the insights for Canada in Section 3, we can conclude that a directed technical change has
not taken place in this economy and, therefore, skilled workers will be allocated mainly
to the Skilled Non-Market Services.
Table 6 shows the results of the GLS estimation for Italy. Mincer returns for tertiary
education are positive. The wages of workers with tertiary education are 23.6% on average
higher than those of workers with non-completed tertiary education. As expected, wages
are higher in all sectors compared to the Unskilled Services: the Skilled Non-Market Ser-
vices pay wages 20.5% higher than the Unskilled Services, the High-Tech Industry 18.2%,
the Low-Tech Industry 11.1%, and the Skilled Market Services 8.1%. Finally, firms located
in Region 1 and 3 pay more28. Workers with tertiary education earn 11.1% more if they
work in the Skilled Market Services rather than in the Unskilled Services and 8.1% more
if they work in the High-Tech Industry. Considering these results, at microdata level, we
argue that directed technical change might have occurred in Italy. However, in Section 3 it
was not possible to analyze how that economy has evolved at macro level. Then, we can-
not draw any certain conclusions about the existence of directed technical change in Italy.
Table 7 shows the results of the GLS estimation for Spain. We only have two years
of information (2010 and 2014) and therefore must be cautious about our conclusions.
27 Examples are: Montreal for Region 1, Toronto for Region 2, Vancouver for Region 3, and Québec for Region
4.
28 Examples are: Trentino alto Adige for Region 1, Toscana for Region 2, Lombardia for Region 3, and Abruzzo
for Region 4.
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Mincer returns for tertiary education are also positive. Workers with tertiary education
have wages 47% higher on average than those who have non-completed tertiary educa-
tion. Wages are higher in the Industry sector (High-Tech and Low Tech) than in the
Unskilled Services sector. The High-Tech Industry pays 34.3% more than the Unskilled
Services while the Skilled Market Services pay less, although this coefficient is not sig-
nificant. Workers with tertiary education earn 10.3% less if they work in the Low-Tech
Industry rather than in the Unskilled Services, 9.0% less if they work in the High-Tech
Industry, 11.1% less if they work in the Skilled Non-Market Services, but 19.9% more
if they work in the Skilled Market Services. Given these results, we argue that directed
technical change might have occurred only in the Skilled Market Services in this country.
However, in Section 3 we claimed that directed technical change might have existed in
the High-Tech Industry but not in the Skilled Market Services. Therefore, the macrodata
and microdata evidence are opposite and we cannot draw any certain conclusions about
the existence of directed technical change in Spain.
Finally, Table 8 sums up the findings from macrodata and microdata evidence about
the existence of directed technical change in the analyzed countries.
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Table 2. GLS Estimation of Wages of U.S.
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.132***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender (Female) -0.312*** -0.310*** -0.422***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Education (Tertiary) 0.995*** 0.997*** 0.542***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Agriculture -0.153*** -0.180*** -0.242***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Low-Tech Industry -0.177*** -0.172*** 0.181***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High-Tech Industry -0.211*** -0.186*** 0.349***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Skilled Market Services 0.308*** 0.310*** 0.226***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Skilled Non-Market Services 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.140***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Agriculture ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.053*** -0.043*** 0.065***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004)
Low-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
High-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.377*** 0.359*** 0.127***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Skilled Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.128***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Skilled Non-Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.122*** -0.120*** -0.053***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Region 1 - -0.053*** 0.056***
(0.001) (0.000)
Region 2 - 0.152*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.000)
Region 3 - 0.214*** 0.044***
(0.001) (0.000)
Constant 5.687*** 5.606*** 4.953***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Geographic Controls NO YES YES
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES
Observations 21,557,941 21,557,941 21,557,941
R-squared 0.133 0.136 0.853
LR χ2 2.361e+05 1.989e+05 5.192e+06
Prob<χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: IPUMS International.
31
Table 3. GLS Estimation of Wages of South Korea.
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender (Female) -0.465*** -0.465*** -0.440***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Education (Tertiary) 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.129***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Agriculture -0.164*** -0.165*** -0.128***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Low-Tech Industry 0.002 0.002 0.037***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
High-Tech Industry -0.001 0.001 -0.003
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Skilled Market Services 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.234***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Skilled Non-Market Services 0.279*** 0.278*** 0.257***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Agriculture ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.357* 0.360* 0.284
(0.212) (0.212) (0.204)
Low-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.080**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
High-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.588*** 0.589*** 0.537***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.055)
Skilled Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.307*** 0.305*** 0.275***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.036)
Skilled Non-Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.246*** 0.246*** 0.230***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
Region 1 - 0.007 0.036*
(0.021) (0.020)
Region 2 - -0.050* 0.006
(0.026) (0.025)
Region 3 - -0.002 0.026
(0.024) (0.023)
Constant -6.261*** -6.265*** -6.581***
(0.058) (0.061) (0.068)
Geographic Controls NO YES YES
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES
Observations 9,625 9,625 9,625
R-squared 0.308 0.309 0.365
LR χ2 306 253 162
Prob<χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Korea Labor Institute.
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Table 4. GLS Estimation of Wages of France.
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender (Female) -0.326*** -0.318*** -0.318***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education (Tertiary) 0.392*** 0.374*** 0.372***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Agriculture -0.147*** -0.137*** -0.134***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Low-Tech Industry 0.059*** 0.070*** 0.072***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High-Tech Industry -0.030*** -0.002 0.003***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Skilled Market Services 0.080*** 0.067*** 0.072***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Skilled Non-Market Services 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Agriculture ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.053** -0.048** -0.048**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Low-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
High-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.180*** 0.163*** 0.162***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Skilled Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.083***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Skilled Non-Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.030*** 0.037*** 0.038***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Region 1 - 0.178*** 0.178***
(0.002) (0.002)
Region 2 - 0.086*** 0.086***
(0.003) (0.003)
Region 3 - 0.129*** 0.129***
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.990*** 0.879*** 0.852***
(0.011) (0.012)
Geographic Controls NO YES YES
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES
Observations 416,896 416,896 416,896
R-squared 0.230 0.241 0.241
LR χ2 8892 7775 2369
Prob<χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies.
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Table 5. GLS Estimation of Wages of Canada.
(1) (2) (3)
Age (25-54 years old) 0.794*** 0.792*** 0.796***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (55-64 years old) 0.713*** 0.711*** 0.704***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender (Female) -0.349*** -0.350*** -0.350***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (Tertiary) 0.277*** 0.276*** 0.271***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Agriculture 0.130*** 0.134*** 0.136***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Low-Tech Industry 0.392*** 0.393*** 0.394***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High-Tech Industry 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.464***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Skilled Market Services 0.264*** 0.261*** 0.263***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Skilled Non-Market Services 0.211*** 0.213*** 0.216***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Agriculture ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.078***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Low-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.110*** -0.109*** -0.110***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.096*** -0.095*** -0.096***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Skilled Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.037***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Skilled Non-Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.109***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Region 1 - 0.091*** 0.091***
(0.001) (0.001)
Region 2 - 0.095*** 0.095***
(0.001) (0.001)
Region 3 - 0.042*** 0.041***
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 7.166*** 7.118*** 7.044***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Geographic Controls NO YES YES
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES
Observations 11,728,036 11,728,036 11,728,036
R-squared 0.364 0.365 0.368
LR χ2 478356 396184 27932
Prob<χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Statistics Canada.
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Table 6. GLS Estimation of Wages of Italy.
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender (Female) -0.283*** -0.290*** -0.290***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (Tertiary) 0.240*** 0.234*** 0.236***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Agriculture -0.227*** -0.202*** -0.203***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Low-Tech Industry 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.111***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High-Tech Industry 0.199*** 0.183*** 0.182***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Skilled Market Services 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.081***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Skilled Non-Market Services 0.199*** 0.207*** 0.205***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Agriculture ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.115*** 0.104*** 0.102***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Low-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
High-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.073*** 0.082*** 0.081***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Skilled Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.111***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Skilled Non-Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Region 1 - 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
Region 2 - -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.002) (0.002)
Region 3 - 0.078*** 0.078***
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 6.111*** 6.095*** 6.130***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Geographic Controls NO YES YES
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES
Observations 1,503,181 1,503,181 1,503,181
R-squared 0.263 0.272 0.275
LR χ2 38269 33033 10552
Prob<χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Institute of Statistics.
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Table 7. GLS Estimation of Wages of Spain.
(1) (2)
Age (20-49 years old) 0.072*** 0.071***
(0.004) (0.004)
Age (50-60 years old) 0.285*** 0.286***
(0.005) (0.005)
Gender (Female) -0.321*** -0.321***
(0.002) (0.002)
Education (Tertiary) 0.476*** 0.470***
(0.003) (0.003)
Low-Tech Industry 0.177*** 0.173***
(0.003) (0.003)
High-Tech Industry 0.343*** 0.343***
(0.005) (0.005)
Skilled Market Services -0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Skilled Non-Market Services 0.233*** 0.235***
(0.004) (0.004)
Low-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.104*** -0.103***
(0.006) (0.006)
High-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.090*** -0.090***
(0.008) (0.008)
Skilled Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.196*** 0.199***
(0.006) (0.006)




Geographic Controls NO NO
Time Fixed Effects NO YES
Observations 426,205 426,205
R-squared 0.210 0.212
LR χ2 9444 8807
Prob<χ2 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Institute of Statistics.
Table 8. Existence of Directed Technical Change.
U.S. South Korea France Canada Italy Spain
Macrodata Approach YES YES YES NO — YES
Few observations In High-Tech Industry
Microdata Approach YES YES YES NO YES YES
Not significant Not significant Few observations
Conclusion YES YES YES NO — —
Lack of clear evidence Lack of clear evidence
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5 Conclusions
An increase in skilled labor supply is common across countries, but the existence of di-
rected technical change is crucial to allocate skilled workers to high TFP sectors and
lead economies towards high income levels. We have faced two paths of structural change
suggested in previous literature —skill-biased structural transformation and stagnant
structural transformation —and we argue that if there is no directed technical change,
skilled workers end up in low TFP sectors, as the path of stagnant structural transforma-
tion suggests. We have proposed an identification of directed technical change through
the analysis of relative TFP between skilled and unskilled sectors and an estimation of
wages. We present macrodata and microdata evidence for the U.S., South Korea, France,
Canada, Italy, and Spain. With the macrodata evidence, we identify that an increasing
relative TFP of skilled versus unskilled sectors suggests that there is directed technical
change in the U.S., France and South Korea. This finding is supported at micro level
through a GLS estimation of wages, in which the coefficients of the interaction term
between tertiary education and high TFP sectors are the highest and significant. This
behavior is also found in the U.S., France and South Korea. Canada has not experienced
directed technical change yet, and we cannot draw any definite conclusions about the ex-
istence of directed technical change in Italy and Spain. Directed technical change can lead
to a reduction of the gap in GDP per capita among countries —relative to the U.S.—,
as observed in the case of South Korea.
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1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Canada France Italy
South Korea Spain United States
Fig. 13. Share of Value Added of Low-Tech Industry Compared to the U.S.
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Fig. 20. Share of Labor of Skilled Non-Market Services Compared to the U.S.
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Fig. 27. Share of Capital of Skilled Non-Market Services Compared to the U.S.
Source: EU KLEMS and WORLD KLEMS Databases.
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Tables
Table 9. Linear Regression of the Share of Value Added of Skilled Sectors and the Share of Completed Tertiary
Educated Population
U.S. South Korea France Italy Spain Canada
Share of Completed Tertiary Educated Population 0.219*** 0.385*** 0.291*** 0.672*** 0.718*** -0.155***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.037) (0.052) (0.076) (0.039)
Constant 0.510*** 0.440*** 0.519*** 0.450*** 0.270*** 0.627***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.021) (0.015)
Observations 35 16 19 18 19 19
R-squared 0.702 0.957 0.785 0.914 0.841 0.479
LR χ2 77.57 311.59 61.91 169.80 89.59 15.61
Prob<χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RMSE 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.016 0.011
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: EU KLEMS, KLEMS and OECD.
Table 10. Linear Regression of the Share of Value Added of Unskilled Sectors and the Share of Completed
Tertiary Educated Population
U.S. South Korea France Italy Spain Canada
Share of Completed Tertiary Educated Population -0.198*** -0.233*** -0.195*** -0.628*** -0.563*** 0.235***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.031) (0.051) (0.082) (0.043)
Constant 0.468*** 0.472*** 0.435*** 0.519*** 0.654*** 0.320***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.023) (0.017)
Observations 35 16 19 18 19 19
R-squared 0.699 0.850 0.697 0.904 0.737 0.642
LR χ2 76.47 79.55 39.07 151.10 47.58 30.53
Prob<χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RMSE 0.011 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.017 0.012
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: EU KLEMS, KLEMS and OECD.
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Skilled Market Services 0.469***
(0.001)
Skilled Non-Market Services 0.382***
(0.001)
Low-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.025***
(0.004)
High-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.063***
(0.004)
Unskilled Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.065***
(0.004)
Skilled Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.063***
(0.004)














Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: IPUMS International.
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Skilled Market Services 0.362***
(0.036)
Skilled Non-Market Services 0.385***
(0.040)
Low-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.204
(0.205)
High-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.253
(0.209)
Unskilled Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.284
(0.204)
Skilled Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.009
(0.205)














Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Korea Labor Institute.
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Skilled Market Services 0.206***
(0.009)
Skilled Non-Market Services 0.149***
(0.009)
Low-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.074***
(0.024)
High-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.210***
(0.024)
Unskilled Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.048**
(0.024)
Skilled Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.132***
(0.024)














Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies.
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Table 14. GLS Estimation of Wages of Canada
VARIABLES ln wage
Age (25-54 years old) 0.796***
(0.001)












Skilled Market Services 0.126***
(0.002)
Skilled Non-Market Services 0.080***
(0.002)
Low-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.032***
(0.003)
High-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.018***
(0.004)
Unskilled Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.078***
(0.003)
Skilled Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.115***
(0.003)














Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Statistics Canada.
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Skilled Market Services 0.283***
(0.002)
Skilled Non-Market Services 0.408***
(0.002)
Low-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.036***
(0.012)
High-Tech Industry ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.021*
(0.012)
Unskilled Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) -0.102***
(0.012)
Skilled Market Services ∗ Education (Tertiary) 0.009
(0.012)














Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: National Institute of Statistics.
